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Abstract
In the transferable belief model (TBM), pignistic probabilities are used for decision making.
The nature of the pignistic transformation is justiﬁed by a linearity requirement. We justify the
origin of this requirement showing it is not ad hoc but unavoidable provides one accepts
expected utility theory.
 2004 Published by Elsevier Inc.
1. Introduction
The transferable belief model (TBM) is a model for the representation of quanti-
ﬁed beliefs held by a belief holder, called You hereafter. We defend the existence
of a two-level mental model: the credal level where beliefs are held and represented
by belief functions, and the pignistic level where decisions are made by maximizing
expected utilities [13]. 1 Hence, we must build a probability measure at the pignistic
level in order to compute these expectations. This probability measure is based on
the agents beliefs, but should not be understood as representing the agents beliefs
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1 From credo, I believe and pignus, a bet, a wage, both in Latin.
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themselves. It is just a probability function derived from the belief function. We call
it a pignistic probability function and denote it BetP to enhance its real nature, a
probability measure for decision-making, for betting. Of course, BetP will be just
a probability measure. The problem is to derive and justify the transformation be-
tween belief functions and pignistic probabilities.
We have proposed one particular transformation, called the pignistic transforma-
tion. Its justiﬁcation was based on an intuitive argument [23; 22, p. 33]. Apparently,
the argument was not convincing for some readers. In this paper, we formalize
the justiﬁcation of the pignistic transformation. Before proceeding with the formal
derivation, we rephrase the intuitive argument.
Example (Buying a drink for Your friend). Suppose You have two friends, Glenn (G)
and Judea (J). You know they will toss a fair coin and the winner will visit You
tonight. You want to buy the drink Your friend would like to receive tonight: coke,
wine or beer. You can only buy one drink. Let D = {coke,wine,beer}.
Let mD[G] be the basic belief assignment (bba) that represents Your belief about
the drink Glenn will ask for, should You know he will come. From mD[G], You build
the pignistic probability function BetPD[G] about the drink Glenn will ask by
applying the (still to be deﬁned) pignistic transformation. Similarly, You build the
pignistic probability function BetPD[J] based on the bba mD[J] that represents Your
belief about the drink Judea will ask for, should You know he will come. The two
pignistic probability functions BetPD[G] and BetPD[J] are the conditional probability
functions about the drink that will be asked for given You know which of Glenn or
Judea will come, respectively. Before knowing who the visitor will be, the pignistic
probability functions BetPD about the drink that Your visitor will ask for is derived
from classical probability theory:
BetPDðdÞ ¼ 0:5BetPD½GðdÞ þ 0:5BetPD½J ðdÞ; 8d 2 D; ð1Þ
where the 0.5 are the probability that the visitor is Glenn and the probability that the
visitor is Judea, respectively. You will use the pignistic probability function BetPD to
decide which drink to buy.
But You might as well reconsider the whole problem and ﬁrst compute mD that
represents Your belief about the drink Your visitor will ask for. We will show that
mD is given by (see also [20]):
mDðdÞ ¼ 0:5mD½GðdÞ þ 0:5mD½J ðdÞ; 8d  D; ð2Þ
where the 0.5 are the basic belief masses given to the fact that the visitor is Glenn or
that the visitor is Judea, respectively. These basic belief masses result from the coin
tossing experiment, and the accepted assumption that the belief that results from an
aleatory experiment is equal to the probability measure associated with the aleatory
experiment.
Given mD, You could then build the pignistic probability BetPD You should use
to decide which drink to buy. It seems reasonable to assume that both solutions must
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be equal. This requirement implies that BetP must satisfy the linearity property
deﬁned in Assumption 1.1. It is the major requirement that will lead to the unique
solution for the pignistic transformation.
Formally the linearity property derived in the above scenario is:
Assumption 1.1 (Linearity property). Let m1 and m2 be two basic belief assignments
on the frame of discernment X. Let F be the pignistic transformation that transforms
a basic belief assignment over X into a probability function BetPX over X. Then F
is said to satisfy the linearity property iff, for any a 2 [0,1],
F ða  m1 þ ð1 aÞ  m2Þ ¼ a  F ðm1Þ þ ð1 aÞ  F ðm2Þ: ð3Þ
Once F satisﬁes the linearity requirement, the derivation of the pignistic transfor-
mation becomes immediate as it turns out to be mathematically identical to the der-
ivation of the Shapley value in cooperative game theory [17,12]. The solution is
presented in the next deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1.1 (The pignistic transformation). Let mX be a basic belief assignment
on space X. Its associated pignistic probability function BetPX on X is deﬁned as
BetPXðxÞ ¼
X
WX;x2W
1
jW j
mXðW Þ
ð1 mXð;ÞÞ ; 8x 2 X; ð4Þ
where jWj is the number of elements of X inW. The transformation between mX and
BetPX is called the pignistic transformation.
The real issue for justifying the pignistic transformation turns out to be the
production of some justiﬁcation for assuming the linearity property.
The resulting pignistic transformation was already proposed in [4,29] as the
natural solution but without justiﬁcation. The intuitive justiﬁcation based on the
previous scenario was presented in [18,19,23].
Our intuitive justiﬁcation turns out not to be as compelling as we expected
and some authors argue that the linearity property is ad hoc. So, we formalize it
here.
We have to be careful about the meaning of the a in Relation (3): the multipliers
of mi are at the credal level whereas those of F(mi) are at the pignistic level. In fact we
will explain that the two a multipliers are numerically equal even thought they cor-
respond to two diﬀerent concepts. We also explain that Relation (3) holds for any
basic belief assignment.
The idea has been defended that the pignistic transformation could simply be de-
rived by assuming the principle of insuﬃcient reason (PIR). We do not support such
a justiﬁcation as we feel the PIR is not an acceptable rationality principle. Indeed it
leads to the many paradoxes described in probability theory, like Buﬀons needle or
Bertrands paradox, etc. [27].
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Authors among which [1,11,2,3] favor using the relative plausibilities on the sin-
gletons for decision making. 2 This solution is similar to the optimistic approach
described in the Choquets capacities framework [14,10] or the upper and lower
probability framework [6–9,25,24,26,15].
Cobb and Shenoy [2,3] defend that the transformation between bbas and
probability functions should satisfy the next requirement: the transformation of
the combination of two bbas (by Dempsters rule of combination) should be a func-
tion (the point wise product) of the transformations of each bba. This requirement is
satisﬁed by the transformation based on the relative plausibilities on the singletons.
Unfortunately, these authors do not explain why this requirement should be
accepted.
In [22] we already discuss what we feel are the weaknesses of decision based on
relative plausibilities.
In the present paper, we formalize the justiﬁcation of the pignistic transformation.
We explain the origin of the linearity requirement, and indicate that it is in fact una-
voidable without violating expected utility theory. The linearity requirement is not
ad hoc but necessary except if one rejects expected utility theory, but this is another
issue not considered here, even though interesting in itself.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the deﬁnition of some
used operators and formalize the concept of conditional belief functions that gener-
alize conditional probability functions into the belief function realm. In Section 3, we
derive the equivalent of Relation (2) and the linearity requirement of Relation (3).
In Section 4, we derive the pignistic transformation.
2. Basic belief assignments
We review a few concepts described in the TBM and used in this paper. Up to
date details on the TBM can be found in [21]. Let X be a ﬁnite set called the frame
of discernment.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Basic belief assignment). A basic belief assignment (bba) is a
mapping mX from 2X! [0, 1] that satisﬁes: PA˝XmX(A) = 1.
Note that mX(;) = 0 is not required. The superscript of mX denotes the frame of
discernment, i.e., the domain of the bba.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Bayesian belief function). A Bayesian belief function on X is a belief
function which associated bba mX satisﬁes mX(A) = 0 whenever jAj 6¼ 1.
Mathematically a Bayesian belief function is just a probability function.
2 The relation was already presented in [28] for approximating belief functions by probability functions,
what does not mean this author proposes it for decision making.
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Deﬁnition 2.3 (Normalized basic belief assignment). A normalized bba is a bba that
satisﬁes: m(;) = 0.
Deﬁnition 2.4 (Normalizing a bba). Given a bba mX, normalizing it consists in the
construction of a normalized bba MX which satisﬁes
MXðAÞ ¼ m
XðAÞ
1 mXð;Þ ; 8A  X; A 6¼ ;;
¼ 0; if A ¼ ;:
Deﬁnition 2.5 (Dempsters rule of conditioning). Let a bba mX and W ˝ X. The bba
mX[W] deﬁned by
mX½W ðAÞ ¼
X
BW
mXðA [ BÞ; 8A  W ;
¼ 0; otherwise:
mX[W] is called a conditional bba on X givenW. The conditioning operation is called
the Dempsters rule of conditioning.
Note that the result of the conditioning is not normalized as in Shafer presenta-
tion. By abuse of language, we nevertheless use the same name as Shafer did.
Deﬁnition 2.6 (The X frame). Let H = {hi: i = 1, . . ., I} and D = {dj: j = 1, . . .,J} be
two ﬁnite spaces 3 and let X = H · D = {xij: i = 1, . . ., I, j = 1, . . .,J} where xij =
(hi,dj). As we will use this frame repeatedly, we deﬁne it as the X frame.
For A ˝ H, B ˝ D, (A,B) denotes the set of elements (x,y) in X such that x 2 A,
y 2 B.
Deﬁnition 2.7 (The marginalization). Let mX be a bba on the X frame. Its
marginalization mXﬂH on H is given by
mX#HðAÞ ¼
X
WX;W #H¼A
mXðW Þ; 8A  H;
where WﬂH = {x: x 2 H,W \ (x,D) 6¼ ;}.
Let the X frame. Given a probability function PX over X, the conditional proba-
bility function PD(Æ jh), denoted here PD[h], results from the conditioning of PX
on h 2 H. The same structure exists in the TBM, which will result in conditional
bbas.
3 Formally, the two spaces must be compatible and independent: see [16, pp. 121 and 127].
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Deﬁnition 2.8 (The conditional bba). Let mX be a bba deﬁned over the X frame.
The bba mD[h] on D for h 2 H is the conditional belief function on D given h. It is
equal to
mD½h ¼ mX½ðh;DÞ#D:
The last marginalization (ﬂD) step is trivial as jhj = 1. It is needed in order to keep
correct domain notation.
3. Deriving the linearity property
In order to derive the linearity property of Assumption 1.1, we consider a betting
framework on the X = H · D frame where we know the conditional bbas on D given
each h 2 H, and an a priori bba mH which happens to be a Bayesian belief function.
In that framework, we show that the pignistic transformation must satisfy the line-
arity property (see Assumption 1.1). In Section 3.4, we show that it must be satisﬁed
for any bba.
3.1. The belief functions
Suppose You hold beliefs about the actual value of X, represented by mX. Sup-
pose You only communicate the conditional bbas of mX on D for every h 2 H and
the marginal of mX on H, which turns out to be a Bayesian belief function. We show
that the underlying bba on X is uniquely deﬁned by this apparently partial
information.
3.1.1. The conditional beliefs
Let the X frame. For each hi 2 H, the conditional bba mD[hi] denotes the normal-
ized bba representing Your beliefs about the actual value of D given You accept as
true that hi is the actual value of H.
3.1.2. The marginal Bayesian belief function
Suppose the marginal bba mXﬂH happens to be a Bayesian belief function denoted
PH.
In the example of Section 1, the conditional bbas are those that represent Your
beliefs about the drink Your visitor will ask for given You know who the visitor will
be, and the marginal Bayesian belief function corresponds to the 0.5 beliefs that
result from the coin tossing experiment.
Lemma 3.1. Given the X frame, the normalized conditional bbas mD[hi] for each
hi 2 H and the Bayesian belief function PH, the only bba mX such that
mX½ðhi;DÞ#D ¼ mD½hi; 8hi 2 H and mX#H ¼ PH
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is given, for all W ˝ X, by
mXðW Þ ¼ mD½hiðDÞPHðhiÞ if W ¼ ðhi;DÞ
¼ 0 otherwise:
Proof. The marginalization of mX on H is a Bayesian belief function, thus no basic
belief mass may be given to any subset of X that is not fully contained in a single
(hi,D). Furthermore, no focal set may be empty; else, the marginal would not be
Bayesian. The only possibly positive masses are given to the non-empty subsets of
the individual (hi,D). Conditioning on hi and normalizing the result produces a con-
ditional belief function which masses are those of mX[hi]. Hence up to proportionally
factors all the masses in (hi,D) are determined, and as their sum must be P
H(hi), the
theorem is proved. h
Lemma 3.2. Under Lemma 3.1 conditions, let mD = mXﬂD. It satisfies for every D ˝ D:
mDðDÞ ¼
X
hi2H
mD½hiðDÞPHðhiÞ:
Proof. Consider D ˝ D. The only masses of mX as given in Lemma 3.1 which margi-
nalization on D is D are those given to (hi,D) for every hi. Thus the theorem. h
3.2. Expectation
Given a variable X and a bba deﬁned on its domain, its expectation is deﬁned
as the classical expectation, the pignistic probability function playing the role of
the probability function.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Expectation). Given a bba mX and a variable X that maps X on the
reals. The expectation of X is
EðX Þ ¼
X
x2X
X ðxÞ  BetPXðxÞ;
where BetPX is the pignistic transformation of mX on X.
3.3. The expected utilities
3.3.1. Utilities
Suppose You have several possible acts, denoted am: m = 1, . . .,K. Let u(am,xij) be
the utility of act am given the actual value of X is xij.
We accept Savage axioms, hence the optimal act is the one for which the expected
utility is maximal. We thus need a probability measure on X. Let it be denoted PX.
We then compute the expected utility um of act am for every m:
P. Smets / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 38 (2005) 133–147 139
um ¼
X
i;j
uðam;xijÞPXðxijÞ: ð5Þ
The optimal decision is the act am that maximizes um.
In order to prove the linearity Theorem 3.1, we further consider the special case
where the utilities do not depend on i. It just means in practice that the utilities of the
acts depend only of the j index of xij. For simplicity sake, we denote u(am,xij) as
u(m, j). These utilities are presented in Table 1 when jDj = 2, and jHj = 3. Relation
(5) becomes
um ¼
X
j
uðm; jÞ
X
i
PXðxijÞ ¼
X
j
uðm; jÞPDðdjÞ: ð6Þ
In the TBM, we will build a pignistic probability function, denoted BetP, that
is used to compute these expected utilities, replacing in fact P by BetP in Relations
(5) and (6).
The pignistic probability function BetP depends of course of Your beliefs. Sup-
pose a ﬁnite frame X, called the betting frame, on which decisions/bets are made.
Let the pignistic transformation be denoted by FX where the superscript X represents
the domain. So FX maps the set of bbas over X on the set of probability measures
over X, and we can write PX = FX(belX). Formally, we assume the next assumption.
Assumption 3.1 (Credal–pignistic link). Let X be a ﬁnite set and let mX be any belief
function deﬁned on X. Let BetPX be its associated pignistic probability function on
X. Then
BetPX ¼ F X ðmX Þ;
or equivalently for all x 2 X,
BetPX ðxÞ ¼ F X ðmX ÞðxÞ;
and for any A ˝ X,
BetPX ðAÞ ¼
X
x2A
BetPX ðxÞ:
This Assumptions 3.1 just translates the idea that our beliefs guide our acts.
We also assume the next assumption.
Table 1
Utilities u(am,xi,j) of act am in context (hi,dj)
d1 d2
h1 u(m, 1) u(m, 2)
h2 u(m, 1) u(m, 2)
h3 u(m, 1) u(m, 2)
H u(m, 1) u(m, 2)
As the utilities do not depend on hi, we denote u(am,xi,j) as u(m, j). The bottom line presents the utilities
over D without regard of the value of H.
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Assumption 3.2 (Projectivity). If mX happens to be a Bayesian belief function PX
deﬁned on X, then FX(PX) = PX.
It just means that the pignistic transformation of a Bayesian belief function pro-
duces a pignistic probability function which is numerically equal to the Bayesian be-
lief function. Assumption 3.2 recognizes that if someones belief is already described
by a probability function, then the pignistic probabilities and the degrees of belief
are numerically equal.
In our example, we know the conditional bbas on D for each hi 2 H as presented
in Table 2. We also know the bba mD, that can as well be denoted by mD[H]. Its value
was derived in Lemma 3.2, and is reproduced at the bottom line of Table 2.
For each hi and for H, we build the pignistic transformation of m
D[hi] and m
D[H]
(see Table 3).
3.3.2. The expected utilities
Expected utilities can be computed in two ways (see Table 4). Consider the con-
ditional bbas mD[hi], then:
Table 2
Conditional bbas and their marginal given the bayesian marginal on H
h1  mD[h1] !
h2  mD[h2] !
h3  mD[h3] !
H  mD[H] =Phi2HmD[hi]PH(hi) !
The bbas are to be read as vectors.
Table 3
Pignistic probabilities induced by the bbas of Table 2
h1  BetPD[h1] = FD(mD[h1]) !
h2  BetPD[h2] = FD(mD[h2]) !
h3  BetPD[h3] = FD(mD[h3]) !
H  BetPD[H] = FD(mD[H]) !
Table 4
Computation of the overall expected utility uðmÞ for act am
d1 d2
h1 u(m, 1)BetP
D[h1](d1) u(m, 2)BetP
D[h1](d2) R! uðmjh1Þ · BetPH(h1)
h2 u(m, 1)BetP
D[h2](d1) u(m, 2)BetP
D[h2](d2) R! uðmjh2Þ · BetPH(h2)
h3 u(m, 1)BetP
D[h3](d1) u(m, 2)BetP
D[h3](d2) R! uðmjh3Þ · BetPH(h3)
H u(m, 1)BetPD[H](d1) u(m, 2)BetP
D[H](d2) R! uðmÞ Rﬂ
R! denotes a sum taken on the terms in the line (thus on D), and Rﬂ denotes a sum taken on the terms in a
column (thus on H).
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1. Method 1.
(a) Compute their pignistic transformation FD(mD[hi]) that are the pignistic
probability functions BetPD[hi] over D conditional on hi (Table 3, lines
1–3).
(b) Compute the expected utility uðmjhiÞ of am in the context where hi holds by
summing the products u(m, j)BetPD[hi](dj) over j (see the R! on lines h1, h2,
h3 of Table 4).
(c) Compute the overall expected utility uðmÞ by summing the products
uðmjhiÞBetPHðhiÞ where BetPH is the pignistic transformation of PH (where
BetPH(hi) and P
H(hi) are numerically equal by Assumption 3.2) (see the bot-
tom right Rﬂ in Table 4).
This approach is used in Lemma 3.3. In the example of Section 1, it corre-
sponds in computing the pignistic probability function for each visitor and
averaging the results.
2. Method 2.
(a) Compute mD[H] as given in Table 2, bottom line.
(b) Compute BetPD[H] as given in Table 3, bottom line.
(c) Compute the expected utility um of act am by adding the products
u(m,j)BetPD[H](dj) (see the R!on bottom line of Table 4).
This approach is used in Lemma 3.4. In the example of Section 1, it corre-
sponds in computing the belief over the drink the visitor will ask for before
knowing who the visitor actually is, and then applying the pignistic transfor-
mation to the resulting bba.
Lemma 3.3. The expected utility of Relation (6) satisfies:
um ¼
X
j
uðm; jÞ
X
hi2H
F DðmD½hiÞðdjÞBetPHðhiÞ: ð7Þ
Proof. One has:
umjhi ¼
X
j
uðm; jÞBetPD½hiðdjÞ Definition 3.1; ð8Þ
BetPD½hi ¼ F DðmD½hiÞ Assumption 3.1; ð9Þ
umjhi ¼
X
j
uðm; jÞF DðmD½hiÞðdjÞ Relations (8) and (9); ð10Þ
um ¼
X
hi2H
umjhiBetP
HðhiÞ Definition 3.1: ð11Þ
Combining Relations (10) and (11), one gets the lemma. h
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Lemma 3.4. The expected utility of Relation (6) satisfies:
um ¼
X
j
uðm; jÞF D
X
hi2H
mD½hiPHðhiÞ
 !
ðdjÞ: ð12Þ
Proof. Relation (6) can be rewritten as
um ¼
X
j
uðm; jÞF DðmD½HÞðdjÞ: ð13Þ
Using Lemma 3.2, we get:
F DðmD½HÞ ¼ F D
X
hi2H
mD½hiPHðhiÞ
 !
: ð14Þ
Combining Relations (13) and (14), one gets the lemma. h
Assumption 3.3. The expected utilities um of Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 are equal.
As Relations (7) and (12) must be equal whatever the utilities u(m, j), their coeﬃ-
cients must be equal. We have then derived the next theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (Linearity theorem). Assumption 3.3 is satisfied for all u(m, j) iff
F D
X
hi2H
mD½hi  PHðhiÞ
 !
¼
X
hi2H
F DðmD½hiÞ  PHðhiÞ: ð15Þ
Proof. As BetPH and PH are numerically equal by Assumption 3.2, the relation is
immediate as the two terms are just the multipliers of u(m, j). h
Relation (15) is exactly the linearity requirement we want to derive. All it requires
is Lemma 3.2 and the acceptance of the expected utility theory.
3.4. Generalization to any bba
We show now that Relation (15) must be satisﬁed for any bba.
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Extreme bba). An extreme bba mX is a bba with only one non-zero
mass. Thus there exist a A ˝ X such that mX(A) = 1, all other masses being null. The
bbas that are not extreme are called non-extreme bbas.
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The extreme bbas are the vacuous belief function (mX(X) = 1), the categorical bba
(mX(A) = 1 for A ˝ X, A 6¼ ;, A 6¼ X) and the full contradictory bba (mX(;) = 1). The
other bbas are non-extreme bbas.
Lemma 3.5. For every non-extreme bba mX, there exists bbas mX1 and m
X
2 and
a 2 [0,1] such that:
mX ¼ a  mX1 þ ð1 aÞ  mX2 :
Proof. Trivial as the set of bbas on X is convex. h
Given any non-extreme bba, we can thus ﬁnd two bbas and write the Relation
(15). For the extreme bbas, we just assume that the FD transformation is continuous.
Assumption 3.4 (Continuity of the pignistic transformation). The pignistic transfor-
mation, i.e., the FD function in Theorem 3.1, is continuous.
Lemma 3.6. Relation (15) holds for any bba mX.
Proof. As a consequence of Lemma 3.5, for any non-extreme bbas m, we can ﬁnd a
set of bbas mi, i = 1, . . .,n, and non-negative weights ai, i = 1, . . .,n, that add to one so
that m =
P
i=1,. . .,naimi. To get Relation (15), replace m
D[hi] by mi and P
H(hi) by ai.
For extreme bbas m, take bbas in any epsilon neighborhood of m. The previous
decomposition can then be applied and Relation (15) is satisﬁed. This being true for
any epsilon, it holds for extreme bbas by continuity. h
4. The pignistic transformation
In order to derive the pignistic transformation some technical assumptions
must be added that are hardly arguable. Hereafter let X be a ﬁnite frame of
discernment.
Assumption 4.1 (Efficiency). BetPX(X) = 1.
Assumption 4.2 (Anonymity). Let R be a permutation function from X to X. The
pignistic probability given to the image R(W) ofW ˝ X after permutation of the ele-
ments of X is the same as the pignistic probability given to W before applying the
permutation:
BetPXðRðW ÞÞ ¼ BetPXðW Þ; 8W  X;
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where BetPX* is the pignistic probability function on X* after applying the permuta-
tion function.
Assumption 4.3 (Impossible event). The pignistic probability of an impossible event
is zero.
Assumption 4.1 tells that the pignistic probabilities given to the elements of X add
to one. Assumption 4.2 states that renaming the elements of X does not change the
pignistic probabilities. Assumption 4.3 is self evident.
Under these assumptions, it is possible to derive uniquely FX.
Theorem 4.1 (Pignistic transformation theorem). Let mX be a bba on space X. Let
BetPX = FX(mX). The only solution BetPX that satisfies Assumptions 3.1–3.3 and 4.1–
4.3 is:
BetPXðxÞ ¼
X
WX;x2W
1
jW j
mXðW Þ
ð1 mXð;ÞÞ ; 8x 2 X; ð16Þ
where jWj is the number of elements of X in W. For non-singleton x ˝ X, we have:
BetPXðW Þ ¼
X
x2W
BetPXðwÞ:
Proof. The requirements are the same as those that underlie the Shapley value. In
particular, the BetPX(x) are non-negative and add to one. The proof can be found
in [17]. h
5. Conclusions
In the transferable belief model (TBM), it is argued that beliefs are represented by
a basic belief assignment (bba), and that decision making must be based on the pig-
nistic probabilities derived from this bba. The transformation from bbas to proba-
bility functions is called the pignistic transformation. Its derivation results from a
linearity requirement. We formally justify the origin of this linearity requirement.
We feel this requirement is unavoidable within the TBM, hence the pignistic trans-
formation is necessary provided the expected utility theory for decision-making must
be satisﬁed.
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